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Abstract. Sanitizable signature (SS) allows a signer to partly delegate signing rights to a predeter-
mined party, called sanitizer, who can later modify certain designated parts of a message originally
signed by the signer and generate a new signature on the sanitized message without interacting with
the signer. One of the important security requirements of sanitizable signatures is accountability, which
allows the signer to prove, in case of dispute, to a third party that a message was modied by the
sanitizer. Trapdoor sanitizable signature (TSS) enables a signer of a message to delegate the power of
sanitization to any parties at anytime but at the expense of losing the accountability property. In this
paper, we introduce the notion of accountable trapdoor sanitizable signature (ATSS) which lies between
SS and TSS. As a building block for constructing ATSS, we also introduce the notion of accountable
chameleon hash (ACH), which is an extension of chameleon hash (CH) and might be of independent
interest. We propose a concrete construction of ACH and show how to use it to construct an ATSS
scheme.
Key words: Trapdoor Sanitizable Signature, Accountability, Chameleon Hash
1 Introduction
Ateniese et al. [1] introduced the notion of sanitizable signature (SS) and presented a generic construction
based on chameleon hash (CH) [18]. Sanitizable signatures allow a signer to partly delegate signing rights
to a predetermined party, called a sanitizer. During signature generation on a message, the signer chooses a
specic sanitizer who, with the knowledge of the putative signature, can later modify certain designated parts
of the message and generate a new signature on the sanitized message without interacting with the signer. The
capability of modication renders sanitizable signatures useful in many applications, such as authenticated
multicast, authenticated database outsourcing and authenticated multimedia content distribution.
Sanitizable signatures are required to possess the following ve security properties [1]:
Unforgeability. An outsider (i.e., neither the signer nor the sanitizer) should not be able to forge the
signer's or the sanitizer's signature.
Immutability. The sanitizer should not be able to produce valid signatures for messages where it has
modied other than the designated parts.
Privacy. Sanitized messages and their signatures should not reveal the original data.
Transparency. An outsider should not be able to decide whether a message has been sanitized or not.
Accountability. In case of a dispute, the signer can prove to a trusted third party that a certain message
was modied by the sanitizer.
Subsequently Canard et al. [8] introduced the notion of trapdoor sanitizable signature (TSS), which is
an extension of SS. TSS enables a signer to delegate the power of sanitization for a signed message to any
party. They also proposed a generic construction of TSS based on identity-based chameleon hash (IBCH)
[2]. However, TSS does not satisfy the security requirement of accountability.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of accountable TSS (ATSS) which lies between TSS and SS.
Like SS, our ATSS scheme satises the accountability property; it allows a signer to generate an ATSS
signature on a message for a predetermined candidate sanitizer. The ATSS signature alone does not provide
the candidate sanitizer the power to modify the underlying message and generate a valid signature on the
modied message. In order to generate a valid signature on a modied message, similar to TSS, the candidate
sanitizer needs to obtain a trapdoor from the signer, in addition to the signer's signature.
One possible application of ATSS is content authentication in tiered multimedia distribution systems
[12]. Such a system consists of a top-tier primary content provider and a number of lower-tier aliating
providers each with its own users. An example is a movie distributer in Hollywood that has a number of
country distributers worldwide. Whenever a new movie is released, the Hollywood distributer signs the video
stream for a country distributor using ATSS and sends the video stream and the signature to the country
distributor for previewing. Upon receiving the video stream, the country distributor veries the authenticity
of the movie using the signature. If the country distributor is interested in distributing the movie, it enters
a contract with or make a payment to the Hollywood distributor. The latter in turn sends a trapdoor to the
former. With the knowledge of the trapdoor, the country distributor can then modify/adapt the movie for
its local market (e. g., adding subtitles in the local language) and generate a valid signature on the modied
video stream.
1.1 Our Contribution
Contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce the notion of ATSS. In an ATSS scheme, a signer needs to predetermine a user as a
candidate sanitizer during the signature generation. This signature alone does not allow the candidate
sanitizer to produce a new signature on a sanitized message. To generate a new signature on a sanitized
message, the candidate sanitizer needs to obtain a trapdoor from the original signer.
2. We extend the notion of CH by introducing the notion of accountable CH (ACH) and dene its security
requirements. We propose a concrete construction of ACH that satises the security requirements in the
random oracle model [6].
3. Based on ACH, we present a generic construction of ATSS. Instantiating the generic construction with
our concrete ACH scheme, we can obtain the rst ATSS scheme.
1.2 Related Work
Sanitizable Signature. The notion of SS was introduced by Ateniese et al. [1]. Such signatures allow a sanitizer
to modify certain designated parts of a signed message and generate a new signature on the sanitized message
without interacting with the signer. Klonowski and Lauks [17] presented several extensions of SS, including
limitation of the set of possible modications of a single mutable block and limitation of the number of
modications of mutable blocks. Pohls et al. [22] integrated SS schemes into the XML signature specication.
Ateniese et al. [1] identied ve security requirements of SS schemes, unforgeability, immutability, privacy,
transparency and accountability. Brzuska et al. [7] revisited these security requirements and investigated their
relationships, showing for example that transparency implies privacy.
Miyazaki et al. [21] used the notion of SS in a slightly dierent vein. Their SS schemes [21, 15, 20] allow
a sanitizer to only delete predetermined parts of a signed message.
The notion of incremental cryptography [5] and homomorphic signatures, which encompass transitive
[19], redactable [16] and context-extraction signatures [24], are also related to SS. We refer the reader to [1]
for details.
Trapdoor Sanitizable Signature. Canard et al. [8] introduced the notion of TSS, in which the power of saniti-
zation is given to possibly several entities. Based on IBCH, Canard et al. [8] proposed a generic construction
of TSS. Recently, Yum et al. [25] presented another generic construction of TSS from ordinary signature
schemes; therefore, one-way functions imply TSS. Bao et al. [4] extended TSS for the hierarchical setting.
Chameleon Hash. Our work is also related to CH functions, which are randomized collision-resistant hash
functions with the additional property that given a trapdoor, one can eciently generate collisions. CH was
rst introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [18]. Other CH constructions were proposed subsequently [9, 3, 14,
13, 11] .
Ateniese and Medeiros [2] extended CH to identity-based setting [23] and introduced the notion of IBCH.
Zhang et al. [26] and Chen et al. [10] followed their work.
2
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are given in Section 2. The notion and
security requirements of ATSS are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the notion and security
requirements of ACH, and propose a concrete construction. In Section 5, we propose a generic construction
of ATSS from ACH and present a specic ATSS scheme based on our ACH scheme. Finally, we state our
conclusion in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
If L is a positive integer, then [1; L] = f1; 2; : : : ; Lg. If A;B are two sets, AnB = fx 2 Ajx =2 Bg. If x1; x2; : : :
are strings, then x1kx2k : : : denotes their concatenation. We denote by R the range of random number. We
say that a function f() is negligible if for every c > 0 there exists an c such that f() < 1=
c for all  > c.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same
order p. A bilinear pairing is a map e : GG! GT with the following properties:
{ Bilinearity: 8g1; g2 2 G;8a; b 2 Zp, we have e(ga1 ; gb2) = e(g1; g2)ab;
{ Non-degeneracy: There exist g1; g2 2 G such that e(g1; g2) 6= 1;
{ Computability: There exists an ecient algorithm to compute e(g1; g2) for 8g1; g2 2 G.
2.2 Computational Die-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
The security of our ACH scheme will be reduced to the hardness of the computational Die-Hellman (CDH)
problem in the bilinear map group system hp;G;GT ; ei in which the ACH scheme is constructed.
Denition 1 Given a bilinear map group system hp;G;GT ; ei, a generator g of G and elements ga; gb 2 G
where a; b are selected uniformly at random from Zp, the CDH problem in the bilinear map group system is
to compute gab. We say that the CDH assumption holds in a bilinear map group system hp;G;GT ; ei if no
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can solve the CDH problem in the bilinear map group system with
non-negligible probability.
3 Accountable Trapdoor Sanitizable Signature and Its Security Requirements
ATSS lies between sanitizable signature and trapdoor sanitizable signature. Like a TSS scheme, an ATSS
scheme includes the algorithms: GlobalSetup, KeyGen, Sign, Trapdoor, Sanitize and Verify. However, in ATSS,
besides the private key of the signer, the inputs of the Sign algorithm include the public key of a candidate
sanitizer and a transaction identifer TID. In order to generate a new signature on a sanitized message, in
ATSS, the inputs of the Sanitize algorithm include the private key of the candidate sanitizer and a trapdoor
associated with the transaction identier TID generated by the signer using Trapdoor algorithm, not just a
trapdoor associated with the transaction identier as in TSS or just the private key of the sanitizer as in SS.
In addition, to settle disputes about the origin of a message-signature pair, an algorithm Proof enables
the signer to produce a proof . The proof  is generated from a set of previously signed messages. A Judge
algorithm then uses the proof  to decide if a valid message-signature pair was created by the signer or the
sanitizer (the lack of such a proof is interpreted as a signer origin).
Concretely, an ATSS scheme is a tuple of algorithms described as follows:
GlobalSetup takes as input a security parameter . It produces a common public parameter param to be
used by all parties in the system.
param GlobalSetup():
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KeyGen takes as input a security parameter  and the common public parameter param. It generates a
public/private key pair (pk; sk). Every party in the system uses this randomized algorithm to generate
a private/public key pair himself or herself.
(pk; sk) KeyGen(; param):
For presentation simplicity, we assume there exist a single singer and multiple sanitizers in the system.
We denote by (pksig; sksig) the key pair of the signer, and by (pksan; sksan) the key pair of a sanitizer.
Sign takes as input a sanitizer's public key pksan, a message m = m1k    kmL, a set of indices I  [1; L]
that are sanitizable, a transaction identier TID and the signer's private key sksig. It outputs a signature
 on m.
  Sign(pksan;m; I;TID; sksig):
We assume that each message signed has a unique transaction identier.
Trapdoor takes as input a message m, a set of indices I that are sanitizable, a transaction identier TID,
a valid signature  on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID) and the signer's private key sksig. It outputs a trapdoor
tdTID.
tdTID  Trapdoor(m; I;TID; ; sksig):
Sanitize takes as input the signer's public key pksig, a message m, a set of the indices I that are sanitizable,
a transaction identier TID, a valid signature  on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID), a trapdoor tdTID associated
with TID, the sanitizer's private key sksan and a new message m
0. It outputs a new signature 0 on
(pksig; pksan;m
0; I;TID).
0  Sanitize(pksig;m; I;TID; ;m0; tdTID; sksan):
Verify takes as input param, the signer's public key pksig, a sanitizer's public key pksan, a message m, a set
of the indices I that are sanitizable, a transaction identier TID and a putative signature . It outputs
1 if the signature  on m is valid and 0 otherwise.
0=1 Verify(param; pksig; pksan;m; I;TID; ):
Proof takes as input param, the signer's private key sksig, a valid signature  on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID), and
a set of (polynomially many) additional message-signature pairs ((pksig; pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q.
It outputs a proof  2 f0; 1g.
  Proof(param; sksig; ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ); ((pksig; pk(i)san;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q):
Judge takes as input param, the signer's public key pksig, the sanitizer's public key pksan, a valid signature
 on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID) and a proof . It outputs a decision d 2 fSig=Sang indicating whether the
message-signature pair ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) was created by the signer or the sanitizer.
d Judge(param; ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ); ):
The usual correctness properties should hold for an ATSS scheme, saying that genuinely signed or
sanitized messages are accepted. Formally, for any security parameter , any message m = m1k    kmL,
any set of indices I  [1; L], any transaction identier TID, param  GlobalSetup(), (pksig; sksig)  
KeyGen(; param), (pksan; sksan) KeyGen(; param),   Sign(pksan;m; I;TID; sksig), tdTID  Trapdoor(m;
I;TID; ; sksig), and 
0  Sanitize(pksig;m; I;TID; ;m0; tdTID; sksan), we must have
Verify(param; pksig; pksan;m; I;TID; ) = 1 and Verify(param; pksig; pksan;m
0; I;TID; 0) = 1:
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The security requirements of an ATSS scheme include unforgeability, indistinguishability and account-
ability. The unforgeability and indistinguishability requirements of ATSS are extended from the security
requirements of TSS [8]. Informally, unforgeability requires that an outsider be not able to forge a signature
on the original or the sanitized message, and indistinguishability requires that an outsider be not able to
decide whether a message has been sanitized or not.
Accountability requires that the origin of a (sanitized) signature be undeniable. We distinguish between
sanitizer- and signer-accountability, as did in [7]. Informally, sanitizer-accountability implies that if a message
has not been signed by the signer, then even a malicious sanitizer should not be able to make a judge accuse
the signer, and signer-accountability implies that if a signed message has not been sanitized, then even a
malicious signer should not be able to make the judge accuse the sanitizer.
Unforgeability: An ATSS scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks, if
for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the probability that A succeeds in the following game
between A and a challenger is negligible in the security parameter :
Setup The challenger runs
param GlobalSetup(); (pksig; sksig) KeyGen(; param); (pksan; sksan) KeyGen(; param);
and sends the common public parameter param, the signer's public key pksig and the sanitizer's public
key pksan to the adversary A.
Query phase The adversary A adaptively issues queries:
1. OSignATSS query on (m; I;TID), where I  [1; L] is a set of indices and TID is a transaction identier:
The challenger forwards the valid signature  on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID) to the adversary.
2. OTrapdoorATSS query on (m; I;TID; ), where  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID): The chal-
lenger forwards the corresponding trapdoor tdTID to the adversary.
3. OSanitizeATSS query on (m; I;TID; ;m0), where mi = m0i for all i =2 I: The challenger forwards the new
valid signature 0 on (pksig; pksan;m0; I;TID) to the adversary.
Output A outputs (m; I;TID; ) and succeeds if the following conditions hold.
1. Verify(param; pksig; pksan;m
; I;TID; ) = 1.
2. A never queries OSignATSS oracle on (m; I;TID).
3. (m; ) does not come fromOSanitizeATSS oracle, i.e.,A never queriesOSanitizeATSS oracle on (m; I;TID; ;m),
where  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I
;TID) and mi = mi for all i =2 I.
4. A never queriesOTrapdoorATSS oracle on (m; I;TID; ), where  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID)
and mi = m

i for all i =2 I.
Indistinguishability: The indistinguishability of an ATSS scheme requires that the output distributions of
Sign algorithm and Sanitize algorithm be computational indistinguishable. In other words, for all suciently
large , any param GlobalSetup(), (pksig; sksig) KeyGen(; param), (pksan; sksan) KeyGen(; param),
any set of indices I  [1; L], any message pairsm;m0 such thatmi = m0i for all i =2 I, any transaction identier
TID, the following distribution ensembles DSanitize and DSign are computational indistinguishable:
DSanitize = f(m0; ^)j  Sign(pksan;m; I;TID; sksig); tdTID  Trapdoor(m; I;TID; ; sksig);
^  Sanitize(pksig;m; I;TID; ;m0; tdTID; sksan)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID;
DSign = f(m0; 0)j0  Sign(pksan;m0; I;TID; sksig)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID:
Sanitizer-accountability: An ATSS scheme is sanitizer-accountable, if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A, the probability that A succeeds in the following game between A and a challenger is
negligible in the security parameter :
Setup The challenger runs
param GlobalSetup(); (pksig; sksig) KeyGen(; param);
and sends the common public parameter param and the signer's public key pksig to the adversary A.
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Query phase The adversary A adaptively issues queries:
1. OSignATSS query on (pksan;m; I;TID), where pksan is a sanitizer's public key chosen by A, I  [1; L] is
a set of indices and TID is a transaction identier: The challenger forwards the valid signature  on
(pksig; pksan;m; I;TID) to the adversary.
2. OTrapdoorATSS query on (pksan;m; I;TID; ), where  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID): The
challenger forwards the corresponding trapdoor tdTID to the adversary.
Output A outputs (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID; ) and succeeds if the following conditions hold.
1. Verify(param; pksig; pk

san;m
; I;TID; ) = 1.
2. ((pksig; pk

san;m
; I;TID); ) 6= ((pksig; pk(i)san;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i)) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; q, where
(pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)) and (i) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; q denote the queries and answers to and from oracle
OSignATSS .
3. Sig Judge(param; ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ); ), where
  Proof(param; sksig; ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ); ((pksig; pk(i)san;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q):
Signer-accountability: An ATSS scheme is signer-accountable, if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A, the probability that A succeeds in the following game between A and a challenger is negligible
in the security parameter :
Setup The challenger runs
param GlobalSetup(); (pksan; sksan) KeyGen(; param);
and sends the common public parameters param and the sanitizer's public key pksan to the adversary
A.
Query phase The adversary A adaptively issues OSanitizeATSS query on (pksig;m; I;TID; ; tdTID;m0), where
pksig is a singer's public key chosen by A,  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID), tdTID is the
trapdoor associated with TID and mi = m
0
i for all i =2 I: The challenger forwards the new valid signature
0 on (pksig; pksan;m0; I;TID) to the adversary.
Output A outputs (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID; ; ) and succeeds if the following conditions hold.
1. Verify(param; pksig; pksan;m
; I;TID; ) = 1.
2. San Judge(param; ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ); ).
3. ((pksig; pksan;m
; I;TID); ) 6= ((pk(i)sig; pksan;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i)) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; q, where
((pk
(i)
sig; pksan;m
(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i)) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; q denote the answers from oracle OSanitizeATSS .
4 Accountable Chameleon Hash and Its Construction
In this section, we rst introduce and formulate accountable chameleon hash (ACH). Then, we present a
construction of ACH and analyze its security in the random oracle model.
4.1 Accountable Chameleon Hash
ACH is a new paradigm which lies between chameleon hash (CH) and identity-based chameleon hash (IBCH).
The inputs of the Hash algorithm of an ACH include two users' public keys and a transaction identier TID,
not just the public key of a single user as in a CH scheme or just an identity as in an IBCH scheme. In order
to nd a collision, the inputs of the Forge algorithm of an ACH scheme include one user's private key and a
trapdoor information associated with the transaction identifer TID generated by the other user, not just a
single user's private key as in a CH scheme or just a trapdoor information associated with an identity as in
an IBCH scheme.
Concretely, an ACH scheme consists of the following algorithms:
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GlobalSetup takes as input a security parameter . It produces a common public parameter param to be
used by all parties in the system.
param GlobalSetup():
KeyGen takes as input a security parameter  and the common public parameter param. It generates a
public/private key pair (pk; sk). All parties in the system use this randomized algorithm to generate a
private/public key pair himself or herself.
(pk; sk) KeyGen(; param):
Hash takes as input param, user i's public key pki, user j's public key pkj , a message m and a unique
transaction identier TID. It chooses a random r and outputs a hash value h.
h Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r):
Trapdoor takes as input user i's private key ski and a transaction identier TID. It outputs the trapdoor
information tdi;TID associated with user i and the transaction identier TID.
tdi;TID  Trapdoor(ski;TID):
Forge takes as input user j's private key skj , the trapdoor information tdi;TID associated with user i and a
transaction identier TID, the hash value h on a message m with user i's public key pki, user j's public
key pkj , the transaction identier TID, random r, and a message m
0. It outputs a random r0.
r0  Forge(skj ; tdi;TID; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r; h;m0):
For correctness, we require that
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r) = h = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m
0; r0) and m0 6= m;
where
r0  Forge(skj ; tdi;TID; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r; h;m0); tdi;TID  Trapdoor(ski;TID):
The security of an ACH scheme consists of two requirements: resistance to collision forgery under active
attacks and forgery indistinguishability.
Resistance to collision forgery under active attacks: The accountable chameleon hash scheme is
secure against (existential) collision forgery under active attacks if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A, the probability that A succeeds in the following game between A and a challenger is negligible
in the security parameter :
Setup The challenger runs
param GlobalSetup(); (pki; ski) KeyGen(; param); (pkj ; skj) KeyGen(; param);
and sends the common public parameter param, user i's public key pki and user j's public/private key
pair (pkj ; skj) to the adversary A.
Query phase The adversary A adaptively issues queries OTrapdoorACH on a transaction identier TID. The
challenger forwards the trapdoor information tdi;TID associated with user i and the transaction identier
TID to the adversary.
Output A outputs (TID;m; r;m0; r0) and succeeds if the following conditions hold.
1. Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m; r) = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m0; r0) and m0 6= m.
2. A never queries OTrapdoorACH on TID.
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Forgery indistinguishability: An ACH scheme is said to be forgery indistinguishable if, for all suciently
large , any param  GlobalSetup, (pki; ski)  KeyGen(; param), (pkj ; skj)  KeyGen(; param), all
transaction identier TID, and all pairs of messages m and m0, the following distribution ensembles are
computational indistinguishable:
DForge = f(m0; r^; h)jr $ R; h Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r); tdi;TID  Trapdoor(ski;TID);
r^  Forge(skj ; tdi;TID; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r; h;m0)g;param;pki;pkj ;TID;
DHash = f(m0; r0; h0)jr0 $ R; h0  Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m0; r0)g;param;pki;pkj ;TID:
4.2 Construction
Our specic construction of an ACH scheme consists of the following algorithms:
GlobalSetup Given a security parameter , it rst generates a bilinear map group system hp;G;GT ; ei. Then,
it picks a generator g of G and chooses a cryptographic hash function H : f0; 1g ! G. The common
public parameter is
param = (p;G;GT ; e; g;H):
KeyGen Given a security parameter  and the common public parameter param, user i rst chooses xi 2 Zp
randomly. Then, set his public key as
pki = g
xi ;
and the private key as ski = xi.
Hash Given param, user i's public key pki, user j's public key pkj , a message m 2 Zp and a unique
transaction identier TID, it chooses R 2 G uniformly at random and computes
h = e(R; g)  e(H(TID)m; pki  pkj);
Finally, it outputs the hash value h.
Trapdoor Given user i's private key ski = xi and a transaction identier TID, it computes
tdi;TID = H(TID)
ski = H(TID)xi ;
and outputs the trapdoor information tdi;TID associated with user i and transaction identier TID.
Forge Given user j's private key skj , the trapdoor information tdi;TID associated with user i and transaction
identier TID, the hash value h on a message m with user i's public key pki, user j's public key pkj ,
transaction identier TID, random R, and a message m0, it computes and outputs
R0 = R  (H(TID)skj  tdi;TID)m m0 :
Note that, for a forgery, we have
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m
0; R0) = e(R0; g)  e(H(TID)m0 ; pki  pkj)
= e(R  (H(TID)skj  tdi;TID)m m0 ; g)  e(H(TID)m0 ; pki  pkj)
= e(R; g)  e((H(TID)skj  tdi;TID)m m0 ; g)  e(H(TID)m0 ; pki  pkj)
= e(R; g)  e((H(TID)xj H(TID)xi)m m0 ; g)  e(H(TID)m0 ; gxi+xj )
= e(R; g)  e((H(TID)xi+xj )m m0 ; g)  e((H(TID)xi+xj )m0 ; g)
= e(R; g)  e((H(TID)xi+xj )m; g);
= e(R; g)  e(H(TID)m; gxi+xj )
= e(R; g)  e(H(TID)m; pki  pkj)
= Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m;R):
So, the above scheme satises correctness. We now turn to security.
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Theorem 1 In the random oracle model, the above construction of accountable CH is secure against (exis-
tential) collision forgery under active attacks, assuming that the CDH assumption holds in the bilinear map
group system hp;G;GT ; ei.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A against the collision resistance of above accountable CH scheme.
We are going to construct another PPT B that makes use of A to solve the CDH problem in a bilinear map
group system hp;G;GT ; ei with non-negligible probability.
B is given as input a random 3-tuple (g; ga; gb), and B's goal is to compute gab. B runs A executing the
following steps.
Setup B rst chooses xj 2 Zp randomly. Then, set the common public parameters as param = (p;G;GT ; e; g;H),
user i's public key as pki = g
a, and user j's public/private key pair as (pkj ; skj) = (g
xj ; xj). The user i's
private key ski = a, which is unknown to B. Here H is a random oracle controlled by B. B also maintains
a list L which is initially empty. Finally, B sends (param; pki; (pkj ; skj)) to the adversary A.
Query phase The adversary A adaptively issues queries:
1. H query on a transaction identier TID: B responds as follows:
{ If a tuple (TID; Q; t; coin) appears in the list L, B forwards Q to A.
{ Otherwise, B picks coin 2 f0; 1g at random such that Pr[coin = 0] = . ( will be determined
later.) Then B chooses t 2 Zp randomly and computes Q = (gb)coin  gt. Finally, the tuple
(TID; Q; t; coin) is added to the list L and Q is sent to A.
2. OTrapdoorACH on a transaction identier TID: Let (TID; Q; t; coin) be the corresponding tuple in the list
L. B responds as follows:
{ If coin = 0, B computes tdi;TID = (ga)t and sends tdi;TID to A. Observe that tdi;TID = H(TID)ski ,
which is the trapdoor information associated with user i and the transaction identier TID.
{ Otherwise, B aborts and terminates.
Output A outputs (TID;m;R;m0; R0) such that
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m;R) = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m0; R0) and m0 6= m:
Let (TID; Q; t; coin) be the corresponding tuple in the list L. B proceeds as follows:
{ If coin = 0, B aborts and terminates.
{ Otherwise, B computes and outputs
(R=R0)1=(m
0 m)
(gbgt)xj  (ga)t :
Observe that,
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m;R) = e(R; g)  e(H(TID)m; pki  pkj) = e(R  (H(TID)xi+xj )m; g);
and
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m0; R0) = e(R0; g)  e(H(TID)m0 ; pki pkj) = e(R0  (H(TID)xi+xj )m0 ; g):
If Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m;R) = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m0; R0), we have
R  (H(TID)xi+xj )m = R0  (H(TID)xi+xj )m0 ;
(R=R0)1=(m
0 m) = H(TID)xi+xj :
If coin = 1, H(TID) = gbgt

; hence
(R=R0)1=(m
0 m) = (gbgt

)a+xj ;
(R=R0)1=(m
0 m)
(gbgt)xj  (ga)t = g
ab:
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Therefore, if B does not abort during the simulation, B will be able to solve the CDH problem. Observe that
the probability that B does not abort during the simulation is given by q(1   ) which is maximized at
 = 1  1=(q+1), where q is the number of OTrapdoorACH queries by the adversary A. Hence, the probability that
B does not abort is at most 1=((q+1)), where  denotes the base of the natural logarithm. This completes
the proof.
Theorem 2 The above construction of ACH is forgery indistinguishable.
Proof. The ACH scheme is said to be forgery indistinguishable, if for all suciently large , any param  
GlobalSetup, (pki; ski)  KeyGen(; param), (pkj ; skj)  KeyGen(; param), all transaction identier TID,
and all pairs of messagesm andm0, the following distribution ensembles are computational indistinguishable:
DForge = f(m0; R^; h)jR $ R; h Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m;R); tdi;TID  Trapdoor(ski;TID);
R^ Forge(skj ; tdi;TID; pki; pkj ;TID;m;R; h;m0)g;param;pki;pkj ;TID;
DHash = f(m0; R0; h0)jR0 $ R; h0  Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m0; R0)g;param;pki;pkj ;TID:
In our ACH construction, because of the non-degeneracy of bilinear pairing, given a hash value h =
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m;R), there is exactly one random element R^ 2 G, such that
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m;R) = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m
0; R^):
Since R is chosen uniformly, R^ is also distributed uniformly and the forgery indistinguishability of our
construction follows.
5 Generic Construction of ATSS from ACH
Based on IBCH, Canard et al. [8] proposed a generic construction of TSS. In their construction, to sign a
message m = m1k    kmL, the signer rst sets ~m = ~m1k    k ~mL, where ~mi = mi if i =2 I and otherwise,
~mi = hi = IBCH.Hash(param; ID;mi; ri). The set of indices I  [1; L] that are sanitizable and the identity
ID associated with the transaction are generated by the signer. Then, the signer signs the message ~m using
a conventional signature scheme. Obviously, an entity with the trapdoor associated with ID generated by
the signer can modify mi and generate a new signature on the sanitized message. Our construction of ATSS
is similar to the construction proposed by Canard et al. [8], but in order to achieve accountability we use
ACH in place of IBCH. In order to generate a new signature on a sanitized message, the sanitizer need to
use his private key and a trapdoor information associated with the transaction identier generated by the
signer to nd a collision of the ACH. The signer can then use the collision to convince a trusted third party
that a message is sanitized, as nobody apart from the sanitizer has more than a negligible probability of
successfully nding a second message that produces the same signing value.
Now, given a regular signature scheme  = (:KeyGen; :Sign; :Verify), and an ACH scheme  =
(:GlobalSetup;:KeyGen;:Hash;:Trapdoor;:Forge), we dene the 8-tuple algorithms (GlobalSetup;KeyGen;
Sign;Trapdoor;Sanitize;Verify;Proof; Judge) of an ATSS scheme as follows:
GlobalSetup Given a security parameter , it rst runs
param  :GlobalSetup();
and chooses two cryptographic hash functions H1 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g;H2 : f0; 1g ! R. Then, it
publishes the common public parameter param = (param ;H1;H2).
KeyGen Given a security parameter  and the common public parameter param, it rst runs
(pk ; sk) :KeyGen(); (pk ; sk) :KeyGen(; param):
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Then, it picks a key sig 2 f0; 1g for the hash function H1, sets the public key pk = (pk ; pk)
and the private key sk = (sk ; sk ; sig). Finally, it publishes pk and keeps sk secret. We denote by
pksig = (pksig; ; pksig;) and sksig = (sksig; ; sksig; ; sig) the public key and private key of the signer,
and by pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;) and sksan = (sksan; ; sksan; ; san) the public key and private key
of a sanitizer.
Sign Given a sanitizer's public key pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;), a message m = m1k    kmL, a set of
indices I  [1; L] that are sanitizable, a transaction identier TID and the signer's private key sksig =
(sksig; ; sksig; ; sig), it proceeds as follows.
1. Compute z = H1(sig;TID).
2. For all i 2 [1; L]nI, set ~mi = mi.
3. For all i 2 I, compute ri = H2(z; i) and
hi = :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mi; ri)
and set ~mi = hi. Let r be the concatenation of all ri, i 2 I.
4. Set ~m = ~m1k    k ~mL and run
~  :Sign( ~m; sksig;):
5. Finally, set  = ~kr and output the signature  on m.
Trapdoor Given a message m, a set of the indices I that are sanitizable, a transaction identier TID, a valid
signature  on (pksig; pksan;m; I;TID) and the signer's private key sksig = (sksig; ; sksig; ; sig), it runs
tdTID  :Trapdoor(sksig; ;TID);
and outputs the trapdoor tdTID associated with TID.
Sanitize Given the signer's public key pksig = (pksig; ; pksig;), a message m = m1k    kmL, a set of
indices I  [1; L] that are sanitizable, the transaction identier TID, a valid signature  = ~kr on
(pksig; pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;);m; I;TID), a trapdoor tdTID associated with TID, the sanitizer's private
key sksan = (sksan; ; sksan; ; san) and a new message m
0 = m01k    km0L, it proceeds as follows.
1. Let I 0 = fi 2 [1; L]jmi 6= m0ig. Check whether I 0  I. If not, output ?, denoted an error.
2. Retrieve fri; i 2 Ig from the signature  = ~kr.
3. For all i 2 I 0, compute hi  :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mi; ri) and
r0i  :Forge(sksan; ; tdTID; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mi; ri; hi;m0i):
4. For all i 2 InI 0, set r0i = ri. Let r0 be the concatenation of all r0i, i 2 I.
5. Set 0 = ~kr0 and output the new signature 0 on (pksig; pksan;m0; I;TID).
Verify Given param, the signer's public key pksig = (pksig; ; pksig;), a sanitizer's public key pksan =
(pksan; ; pksan;), a message m = m1k    kmL, a set of indices I  [1; L] that are sanitizable, a trans-
action identier TID and a putative signature  = ~kr, it proceeds as follows.
1. Retrieve fri; i 2 Ig from the signature  = ~kr.
2. For all i 2 [1; L]nI, set ~mi = mi.
3. For all i 2 I, compute
hi = :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mi; ri)
and set ~mi = hi.
4. Set ~m = ~m1k    k ~mL and output :Verify(pksig; ; ~m; ~).
Proof Given param, the signer's private key sksig = (sksig; ; sksig; ; sig), a valid message-signature pair
((pksig = (pksig; ; pksig;); pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;);m; I;TID); ), and a set of (polynomially many)
additional message-signature pairs MesSigS = ((pksig; pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q generated
originally by the signer, it rst searches the setMesSigS to nd a tuple ((pksig; pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)); (i))
such that
1. pksan = pk
(i)
san; I = I(i) and TID = TID
(i).
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2. I 0  I, where I 0 = fj 2 [1; L]jmj 6= m(i)j g. Note that, m = m1k    kmL and m(i) = m(i)1 k    km(i)L .
3. :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mj ; rj) = :Hash(param; pksig; ; pk
(i)
san; ;TID;m
(i)
j ; r
(i)
j ) for
all j 2 I 0, where  = ~kr, r = frj ; j 2 Ig, (i) = ~kr(i) and r(i) = fr(i)j ; j 2 Ig.
Then, it computes zi = H1(TID
(i); sig). Finally, it outputs the proof  = (pksig; pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i); (i); zi).
Judge Given param, the signer's public key pksig = (pksig; ; pksig;), the sanitizer's public key pksan =
(pksan; ; pksan;), a valid message-signature pair ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) and a proof  = (pksig; pk
(i)
san;
m(i); I(i);TID(i); (i); zi). Let  = ~kr where r = frj ; j 2 Ig, and (i) = ~kr(i) where r(i) = fr(i)j ; j 2 Ig,
it rst checks whether the following conditions hold:
1. pksan = pk
(i)
san; I = I(i) and TID = TID
(i);
2. (m;) 6= (m(i); (i));
3. I 0  I, where I 0 = fj 2 [1; L]jmj 6= m(i)j g. Note that, m = m1k    kmL and m(i) = m(i)1 k    km(i)L ;
4. :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;mj ; rj) = :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m
(i)
j ; r
(i)
j ) for
all j 2 I 0;
5. r
(i)
j = H2(zi; j) for all j 2 I.
If so, it outputs San indicating the message-signature pair ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) was created by
the sanitizer; else it outputs Sig indicating the message-signature pair ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) was
created by the signer.
It is obvious that the above ATSS scheme satises correctness. We now state the security theorems of the
scheme, including unforgeability, indistinguishability and accountability.
Theorem 3 (Unforgeability) If the signature scheme  is existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attacks and the ACH scheme  is resistant to collision forgery under active attacks, the above
construction of ATSS is existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. As usual [8], for presentation simplicity, we assume that a message consists of a single block (extension
to the general case is straightforward). Let A be a forger against the above ATSS scheme and let (m; I =
f1g;TID; ) be the forgery produced by A. We distinguish between two cases of forgery:
Case 1: m is a non-sanitized message and A never queries OSignATSS oracle on (m; I;TID).
Case 2: m is a sanitized message.A never queriesOSanitizeATSS on (m; I;TID; ;m) orOTrapdoorATSS on (m; I;TID; ),
where  is a valid signature on (pksig; pksan;m; I
;TID) and m 6= m.
To prove this theorem, we will show that in the rst case, we can use A as a sub-routine to construct another
algorithm B, which is a forgery against the signature scheme , and in the second case, we can use A as
a sub-routine to construct another algorithm B, which is a forgery against the ACH scheme . Initially, B
will choose a random bit b 2 f1; 2g that indicates its guess for the case of forgery that A will produce. B
proceeds dierently for each case.
Case 1. Given a public key pk and a signing oracle OSign of the signature scheme , using A as a sub-
routine, B simulates a forger against the signature scheme . B proceeds as follows.
Setup B rst runs:Setup algorithm to generate a pair of keys (pk ; sk) and picks a key sig 2 f0; 1g
for the hash function H1. Then, B sets the signer's public key pksig of the above ATSS scheme as
pksig = (pk
; pk). The signer's private key sksig = (sk; sk ; sig) and sk is unknown to B. Next,
B runs KeyGen algorithm of the above ATSS to generate a pair of key
(pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;); sksan = (sksan; ; sksan; ; san))
for the sanitizer. Finally, B gives the signer's public key pksig and the sanitizer's public key pksan to
A.
Query phase A adaptively issues queries:
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1. OSignATSS queries: B runs Sign algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the knowledge of sig and
the help of its OSign oracle, and sends the results to A.
2. OTrapdoorATSS queries: B runs Trapdoor algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the knowledge of
sk , and sends the results to A.
3. OSanitizeATSS queries: B runs Sanitize algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the knowledge of sk
and sksan, and sends the results to A.
Output A outputs a forgery (m; I = f1g;TID;  = ~kr) against the above ATSS scheme. B
proceeds as follows.
1. Computes h = :Hash(param; pk ; pksan; ;TID;m; r) and set ~m = h.
2. Output ( ~m; ~).
It is obvious that if (m; I;TID;  = ~kr) is a successful forgery against the above ATSS scheme,
( ~m; ~) is a successful forgery against the signature scheme .
Case 2. Given user i's public key pki, user j's public/private key pair (pkj ; skj) and a trapdoor generation
oracle OTrapdoor of the ACH scheme , using A as a sub-routine, B simulates a forger against the ACH
scheme . B proceeds as follows.
Setup B rst runs :KeyGen algorithm to generate a pair of keys (pk ; sk) and picks a key sig 2
f0; 1g for the hash function H1. Then, B sets the signer's public key pksig of the above ATSS scheme
as pksig = (pk ; pki). The signer's private key sksig = (sk ; ski; sig) and ski are unknown to B.
Next, B runs :KeyGen algorithm to obtain another pair of key (pk0 ; sk0) and picks another key
san 2 f0; 1g for the hash function H1, and sets the sanitizer's public/private key pair as
pksan = (pk
0
 ; pkj); sksan = (sk
0
 ; skj ; san):
Finally, B gives the signer's public key pksig and the sanitizer's public key pksan to A.
Query phase A adaptively issues the following queries:
1. OSignATSS queries: B runs Sign algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the knowledge of sk and
sig, and sends the results to A.
2. OTrapdoorATSS queries: B runs Trapdoor algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the help of its
OTrapdoor oracle, and sends the results to A.
3. OSanitizeATSS queries: B runs Sanitize algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the help of its OTrapdoor
oracle and the knowledge of sksan, and sends the results to A.
Output A outputs a forgery (m; I;TID;  = ~kr) against the above ATSS scheme. Note that,
in this case, m is a sanitized message. So, there exists a message m, corresponding to a signature
 = ~kr, which has been asked to OSignATSS oracle, such that
Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID
;m; r) = Hash(param; pki; pkj ;TID;m; r):
B outputs (TID;m; r;m; r).
It is obvious that if (m; I;TID;  = ~kr) is a successful forgery against the above ATSS scheme,
(TID;m; r;m; r) is a collision against the ACH scheme .
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4 (Indistinguishability) If the ACH scheme  is forgery indistinguishable, in the random ora-
cle model, the following distributions DSanitize and DSign are computational indistinguishable for all suciently
large , any param GlobalSetup, (pksig; sksig) KeyGen(; param), (pksan; sksan) KeyGen(; param),
any set of indices I  [1; L], any message pairs m;m0 such that mi = m0i for all i =2 I, and any transaction
identier TID:
DSanitize = f(m0; ^)j  Sign(pksan;m; I;TID; sksig); tdTID  Trapdoor(m; I;TID; ; sksig);
^  Sanitize(pksig;m; I;TID; ;m0; tdTID; sksan)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID;
DSign = f(m0; 0)j0  Sign(pksan;m0; I;TID; sksig)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID:
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Proof. To keep the presentation compact and without loss of generality, we assume that messages m and m0
consists of a single block. In the above ATSS scheme, DSanitize = f(m0; ^ = ~kr^)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID and
DSign = f(m0; 0 = ~0kr0)g;param;pksig;pksan;I;TID, where
r
$ R; h :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m; r); ~  :Sign(h; sksig;);
:Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m; r) = :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m
0; r^);
and
r0 $ R; h0  :Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m; r); ~0  :Sign(h0; sksig;):
Note that, r
$ R and r0 $ R are derived from the assumption that H2 is a random oracle. Because 
is forgery indistinguishable, it is obvious that DSanitize and DSign are indistinguishable. This completes the
proof.
Theorem 5 (Sanitizer-accountability) If the signature scheme  is existential unforgeable under adap-
tive chosen message attacks, the above construction of ATSS is sanitizer-accountable.
Proof. Assume that the scheme is not sanitizer-accountable and there is a successful adversary A. We will
show that we can use A as a sub-routine to construct another algorithm B, which is a forgery against the
signature scheme . Again, without loss of generality, we assume that a message consists of a single block.
Given a public key pk and a signing oracle OSign of the signature scheme , using A as a sub-routine,
B simulates a forger against the signature scheme . B proceeds as follows.
Setup B rst runs :Setup algorithm to generate a pair of keys (pk ; sk) and picks a key sig 2 f0; 1g
for the hash function H1. Then, B sets the signer's public key pksig of the above ATSS scheme as
pksig = (pk
; pk). The signer's private key sksig = (sk; sk ; sig) and sk is unknown to B. Finally, B
gives the signer's public key pksig to A.
Query phase A adaptively issues queries:
1. OSignTSS queries on (pksan;m; I;TID): B runs Sign algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the
knowledge of sig and the help of its OSign oracle, and sends the results to A.
2. OTrapdoorTSS queries on (pksan;m; I;TID; ): B runs Trapdoor algorithm of the above ATSS scheme with
the knowledge of sk , and sends the results to A.
Output A outputs (pksig; pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;);m; I = f1g;TID;  = ~kr) against the sanitizer-
accountability of above ATSS scheme. B does as follows.
1. Compute h = :Hash(param; pk ; pksan; ;TID;m; r) and set ~m = h.
2. Output ( ~m; ~).
Let (pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)) and (i) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; q denote the queries and answers to and from oracle
OSignATSS . If A is a successful adversary, then the message-signature pair ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) is not
sanitized from ((pksig; pk
(i)
san;m(i); I(i);TID
(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q. Hence, ( ~m
; ~) is a successful forgery against
the signature scheme . This completes the proof.
Theorem 6 (Signer-accountability) If the ACH scheme  is resistant to collision forgery under active
attacks, in the random oracle model, the above construction of ATSS is signer-accountable.
Proof. Assume that the scheme is not signer-accountable and there is a successful adversary A. We will show
that we can use A as a sub-routine to construct another algorithm B, which is a forgery against the ACH
scheme . As before, we assume that a message consists of a single block. B proceeds as follows.
Setup B rst runs KeyGen algorithm of the above ATSS to generate a pair of keys
(pksan = (pksan; ; pksan;); sksan = (sksan; ; sksan; ; san))
for the sanitizer. Then, B gives the sanitizer's public key pksan to A.
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Query phase A adaptively issues queries OSanitizeATSS query (pksig;m; I;TID; ; tdTID;m0): B runs Sanitize al-
gorithm of the above ATSS scheme with the knowledge of the private key sksan and the trapdoor tdTID,
and sends the results to A.
Output A outputs (pksig; pksan;m; I = f1g;TID; ; ) against the signer-accountability of above
ATSS scheme. Let  = ~kr and  = (pksig; pksan;m0; I = f1g;TID; 0 = ~0kr0; z0), B outputs
(TID;m; r;m0; r0).
Now, we show that (TID;m; r;m0; r0) is a collision against the accountable CH scheme. Let ((pk(i)sig; pksan;
m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i)) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; q denote the answers from oracleOSanitizeATSS . IfA is a successful adversary,
then
1. ((pksig; pksan;m
; I;TID); ) 6= ((pk(i)sig; pksan;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q;
2. ~ = ~0 and H2(z0; 1) = r0;
3. Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID
;m; r) = Hash(param; pksig; ; pksan; ;TID;m0; r0).
Note that, B does not know the trapdoor tdTID associated with TID since ((pksig; pksan;m; I;TID); ) 6=
((pk
(i)
sig; pksan;m
(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q. Assuming that H2 is a random oracle, then
((pksig; pksan;m
0; I;TID); 0) 6= ((pk(i)sig; pksan;m(i); I(i);TID(i)); (i))i=1;2;:::;q;
with overwhelming probability, becauseA cannot nd z0 such thatH2(z0; 1) = r0. Therefore, (TID;m; r;m0; r0)
is a collision against the accountable CH scheme . This completes the proof.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we motivated and introduced the notion of accountable trapdoor sanitizable signature (ATSS).
As a building block of ATSS and that might be of independent interest, we also introduced the notion of
accountable chameleon hash (ACH), which is an extension of chameleon hash. We dened the security
requirements for ACH, and proposed a concrete construction that satises the requirements based on the
CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Finally, Based on ACH, we proposed a generic construction of
ATSS. Instantiating the generic construction with our ACH scheme, we constructed the rst ATSS scheme.
An important future research problem is to construct ACH schemes (and thus accordingly, ATSS schemes)
in the standard model.
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